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Many websites use Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds to actively push their online content to users rather
than waiting for users to pull the content passively. In this paper, I construct a theoretical game model to
study the proﬁtability of an RSS-PUSH delivery mechanism. The model assumes a general proﬁt structure
for websites and heterogeneous users. To access valuable online content, users incur a variety of costs.
They choose either to visit the website in the conventional way (the PULL model) or, if it is supported by
the website, to use RSS (the PUSH model). Interestingly, I show that although the use of the RSS technology
always helps a website to attract more users, it may also reduce the website's proﬁt. This happens because
newly attracted users are not proﬁtable enough to offset the website's increase in maintenance costs and
decrease in advertising revenue. I also demonstrate that RSS adoption can result in ﬁrst-mover disadvantage
instead of advantage. Under certain conditions, the beneﬁciary of the new technology adoption is not the ﬁrst
adopter, but rather its competitor. Applying my ﬁndings to the practice, I suggest that certain types of
websites should not use RSS feeds to deliver online content. In addition, I show that the key to successful
RSS advertising is to strike a balance between consistently valuable content and occasional related advertise-
ments. I also derive the maximum volume of advertisements that can be included in RSS feeds.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Internet has dramatically changed the quantity and types of in-
formation that can be presented and shared, and serves as a platform
for information acquisition and distribution to users around the world.
The conventional way for users to access online information is through
a PULL model, in which users seek information on the Web, either by
manual searches or the use of independent agents [16]. Though a variety
of PULL technologies exist, they all involveWeb searching. To locate use-
ful information, the user bears the costs of searching. In addition, during
his search, the user also bears the costs of downloading and viewing
advertisements, which—especially when they are large or include
graphs, music, or videos—can be time-consuming and effortful to view.
As the Internet grows in size and complexity, steadily more infor-
mation becomes available online. Users face information overload
[21,26], and it is not always easy for them to pull content. As a result,
there is an increasing demand for a new type of information access
and delivery model. The Really Simple Syndication (RSS) technology
has emerged over the past decade to meet the demand. RSS serves
as a delivery mechanism for websites to push online content to po-
tential users and as an information aggregator and ﬁlter for users
[8,12,29]. To use RSS, a website creates RSS feeds that are attached
to its content.1 Meanwhile, users install an RSS reader, which is
essentially a software program that is downloadable from the Inter-
net. Users select and add RSS feeds into their RSS reader to create a
personalized list of content they are interested in. The RSS reader pe-
riodically searches the various feeds, checks for the most recent up-
dates, and delivers text abstracts, summaries, headlines, etc., with a
link to the full text. In addition, most RSS readers are now able to
block online advertisements effectively. Using RSS, valuable online
content is pushed to potential users; there is no need to perform
manual searches, and irrelevant content and unwanted advertise-
ments are ﬁltered out [15].2
RSS technology allows website owners to shift from the conven-
tional PULL model to the PUSH model for online content delivery.3
The key difference between the two models is who initiates the deliv-
ery. Under the PULL model, websites are passive; they wait for users
to visit them after initiating a search. When competing websites pro-
vide similar or identical content and services, and when these com-
peting websites are just one click away, it is difﬁcult for a website to
distinguish itself from others, attract new users, and retain existing
ones. Under the PUSH model, however, websites initiate content de-
livery by informing potential users of updates [11]. They actively cre-
ate the user's demand for the information being delivered. Once
selected by a user to be listed in his RSS reader, the website builds a
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1 The ofﬁcial RSS icon is a square with rounded corners, usually orange, indicating
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2 A concrete deﬁnition and introduction of RSS can be found at http://en.wikipedia.
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3 The term PUSH technology is used to describe “anything from broadcasting to se-
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long-term relationship with the user, which is an advantage in its
competition with other websites.
Both websites and users welcomed RSS. In 2005, about 30% of con-
sumer media websites provided content via RSS feeds [4]. By 2008,
this number had increased to 50% [17]. The number of RSS feeds
grew from 307,000 in 2004 to 13 million in 2005 [3] and to 16 million
in 2007, which includes approximately 75,000 professionally pub-
lished sources such as the BBC, CNN, and The New York Times [7].4
Many websites use RSS feeds to offer customized pages for users.
For example, Yahoo! has RSS feeds for its customizable My Yahoo!
pages, and Google has taken steps to introduce a customizable
home page [24]. These major Internet companies are also the pro-
viders of RSS readers. In 2007, Google bought RSS publishing and an-
alytics service Feedburner for $100 million, and the new Google
Reader became a dominant product in the RSS reader market [20].
More and more professionals now use RSS feeds in a variety of in-
novative ways. For example, Google Reader, Newsgator, and Netvibes
offer mobile versions of their feed readers [20]. Financial institutions
are reaching out to clients using RSS feeds [14], and many Twitter
users receive their Tweets via RSS [30]. Interest in RSS increases
steadily; in 2007, “RSS” was Google's third most frequently searched
“what is” term [20]. The RSS-user adoption rate reached 11% among
all Internet users in 2008, which is an impressive increase when com-
pared to the rate of 2% three years ago [17]. As pointed out by ana-
lysts, among users who haven't adopted RSS, most don't understand
what it is; the rest are not sure whether they use RSS or not. It is com-
monly believed that there is a large potential market for RSS, but sup-
pliers will ﬁrst need to educate users about its beneﬁts.
RSS has attracted the interest of researchers, who have begun to
study how RSS can be applied to a variety of ﬁelds. Blekas et al.
[2,9], for instance, have investigated the use of RSS feeds for effective
mobile web browsing. They propose a new technology that uses RSS
feeds to scan websites, remove unwanted information, and eventual-
ly present a set of packed versions that achieve better content adap-
tation for use in mobile phones. Ning et al. [25] present RSS as a
framework for enabling ranked semantic searches on the semantic
web, Glotzbach et al. [10] provide a novel implementation of RSS as
a method of distributing and delivering course information, and Li
and Wu [22] discuss RSS use in libraries.
This paper differs from previous work in two ways. First, I focus on
the use of RSS on a website as an online content delivery method. Sec-
ond, I conduct a proﬁtability analysis for websites and study the eco-
nomic, rather than technical, aspects of adopting RSS. In this paper,
RSS adoption is considered as a strategy for websites to reach and at-
tract potential users; the major research question is whether adop-
tion of the RSS-PUSH delivery model increases proﬁts for websites.
Researchers have shown that there are no absolutes in terms of
drawbacks and beneﬁts when adopting a new technology or business
strategy. One example is third-party software add-ins. Although
add-ins enhance the functionality of the base product, it may also in-
crease or decrease proﬁt for the base software producer [6]. Another
example is the online customization strategy, which can be used as
a price-discrimination tool for sellers to gain higher proﬁt. Dewan et
al. [5], however, have shown that in a simultaneous adoption game,
the two competing ﬁrms face a prisoner's dilemma in which it is
not necessarily optimal to adopt the customization strategy in a com-
petitive market. Offering RSS feeds introduces a convenient new vis-
iting channel for users, who can now visit the website through
either the conventional or the RSS channel. How do these compete
with each other? In the literature, channel cannibalization and
product-line cannibalization have been documented in many scenar-
ios [27,28]. In some circumstances, the coexistence of multiple
delivery channels or multiple products with different qualities will
have strong cannibalization effects and result in lower proﬁt for the
provider. Will cannibalization also occur between conventional PULL
and RSS-PUSH channels? Will RSS technology eventually beneﬁt or
hurt the website? These are the research questions addressed here.
In this paper, I look at the decision a website confronts: to provide
RSS feeds for its online content or not. The economic impacts of RSS
adoption are investigated; I study changes in number of visitors, mar-
ket share, total trafﬁc load, and proﬁt for the website. Findings are
expected to provide insight for practitioners, such as website de-
signers, online advertisers, and individual Internet users.
My analysis shows that offering RSS feeds will always attract more
website trafﬁc, but it may also reduce the website's proﬁt. Therefore,
the strategy of actively pushing information to users is not always
recommended. More interestingly, I ﬁnd that the so-called “ﬁrst
mover” advantage may not exist in the RSS adoption scenario. I derive
conditions under which RSS adoption is and is not proﬁtable. The
ﬁnding that the success of RSS adoption actually depends on a
website's concrete proﬁt structure suggests that the PULL and PUSH
delivery models are suitable for different types of website. In other
words, I show that RSS isn't automatically advantageous [30].
This work also addresses the recent debate as to whether and how
websites should add advertisements to their RSS feeds. Despite its na-
ture of ﬁltering out online advertisements, RSS has caught great at-
tention and interest from the online advertising community. In
addition, because the use of RSS typically will attract more trafﬁc
but may not improve proﬁts, publishers have started to move toward
monetizing RSS feeds [13]. Google, Yahoo!, Kanoodle, and RSS
advertisement networks like Pheedo were the ﬁrst movers of RSS ad-
vertising [23,24]. For example, Google's AdSense for Feeds offers con-
textually targeted advertisements, while Pheedo displays categorized
advertisements in RSS feeds [13].5 To examine how this emerging
trend will affect RSS adoption, I extend my model to include RSS
advertising. I show that the key for successful RSS advertising is to
ﬁnd a balance between consistently high-quality content and occa-
sional related advertisements. If the volume of advertisements is in
balance with the volume of content delivered, advertising in RSS
feeds is a valid way to improve a website's proﬁt. If, however, balance
is not attained, publishers may be forced to move to a subscription
RSS feed model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 analyzes a website's RSS adoption decision and its economic
impacts. Section 4 extends the analysis by including RSS advertising
in the model. Section 5 summarizes my major ﬁndings, discusses
their business implications, and concludes the paper.
2. The model
The website offers valuable online content to users (also called
website “visitors”). The proﬁt function of the website takes the form
of
π ¼ A  ND þ p  N−c  ρ; ð1Þ
where N, ND, and NR are the total number of visitors, the number of
direct visitors, and the number of RSS visitors to the site, respectively,
and N=ND+NR. Direct visitors are users who visit the website in the
conventional way, by pulling useful information from the site through
searches. RSS visitors use RSS technology. They wait for the informa-
tion to be pushed to them and access it through the link provided by
the RSS reader.
The website's revenue comes from two sources: online advertising
(A∗ND) and content (p∗N). First, the website gains online advertising
4 For example, NYTimes.com lists its free RSS feeds online (http://www.nytimes.
com/services/xml/rss/index.html). These feeds include news headlines, summaries,
and links to the NYTimes.com site for full articles.
5 Please refer to http://www.google.com/adsense and http://www.pheedo.com
respectively.
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revenue. Multiple advertising pricingmodels exist, such as a ﬂat fee to
have an advertisement appear for a certain period of time on the
website or a payment only when users of the website click on the ad-
vertisements. In this paper, however, it does not matter what the con-
crete advertising pricing method is. All I assume is that direct visitors,
when they are searching and browsing the website, are exposed to a
variety of online advertisements; hence they generate advertising rev-
enue for the website. The parameter A denotes the expected advertis-
ing revenue from an average direct visitor. However, RSS visitors are
not signiﬁcant contributors to the website's advertising revenue,
largely becausemost current RSS software can effectively block online
advertisements. RSS visitors access desired content through the link
provided in the RSS feeds, skipping the Web-browsing process. As a
result, they are not exposed to various advertisements they would
otherwise have seen on Web pages. Although there is debate about
the beneﬁts of adding advertisements to RSS feeds, it is not yet a com-
mon phenomenon. My analysis begins by considering RSS feeds with-
out advertisements. Later, in Section 4, I extend the model to include
RSS advertising and examine how it may change the results.
The website also gains content-sales revenue (p∗N) when visitors
consume its online content. Depending on the type of website,
content-sales revenue may have different names in practice. For in-
stance, on e-commercewebsites, it refers to the business proﬁt generat-
ed from a visitor's online product purchase or service consumption;
on news portals that charge visitors for accessing certain speciﬁc con-
tent, it is termed the “view-by-pay” income. Regardless of the website
type, content-sales revenue in this paper measures a visitor's non-
advertising value contribution to the website. The parameter p denotes
the expected content-sales revenue from a visitor.6 In the special case
that the website offers completely free content, I simply set p=0;
thus, the model setting is general to include all possible scenarios.
The last term in Eq. (1) is the website's total maintenance costs,
which are calculated as the product of the unit maintenance cost c
and the website's effective trafﬁc load of ρ. The detailed expression
of ρ is discussed later.
When the website uses the conventional PULL model for content
delivery, it passively waits for website visitors. Users log on, browse,
and search through the website. After going through a number of
web pages, they eventually locate and consume the desired content,
which creates a value b to users. Users are heterogeneous in their
Web browsing behavior. Some enjoy browsing websites; others
have a strong preference for what they are interested in and do not
enjoy reviewing unrelated information. To capture this natural differ-
ence in the user population, I assume that a user's value from Web
browsing, denoted by x, follows a uniform distribution, x~U[0,a].
When users access online information using the PULL model, as
described above, they are called “direct visitors.” A direct visitor in-
curs three types of costs: (1) Searching costs S. The visitor pays for ef-
forts to search through a number of web pages to reach his desired
content. (2) Trafﬁc costs wρ. Heavy trafﬁc to the website could
cause problems, such as the slow delivery of web pages, deteriorating
content quality, and even delivery failure. A visitor therefore incurs
disutility when the website is busy, and such disutility increases in
the total trafﬁc load ρ. (3) Anti-advertising costs CA. I assume that
users, by nature, dislike online advertisements. Downloading and
viewing advertisements are thus costly for them.
Hence, the utility of a direct visitor could be written as UD=
x+b−p−S−CA−wρ.
When the website adopts RSS technology to push its online con-
tent to potential users, users are able to skip the searching process.
The RSS reader also helps to block online advertisements. RSS visitors
therefore avoid the costs of searching and of viewing unwanted
advertisements, but they still bear trafﬁc costs. The utility function
for an RSS visitor is UR=b−p−wρ.
Direct and RSS visitors impose different levels of trafﬁc load on the
website. Direct visitors search, download, and visit a number of pages.
The effective trafﬁc load imposed by a direct visitor is normalized to
be 1. RSS visitors skip the searching process and reach the pages
containing their desired content in one click. They are likely, there-
fore, to impose less trafﬁc, which is assumed to be θ, θ≤1.
Hence, a website's effective trafﬁc load can be expressed as
ρ ¼ ND þ θNR: ð2Þ
Table 1 lists the parameters and variables used in the paper.
Finally, I make Assumption 1 that CA+S+p−a≤b≤CA+S+
p+aw to avoid trivial cases in the analysis. If the right inequality is
violated, the website will always attract all users (a fully covered
market). If the left inequality is violated, the website will get no visi-
tors at all (an empty market).
3. The analysis
3.1. The monopoly website
As my benchmark case, I take the case that a monopoly website
does not adopt the RSS-PUSH technology and call it “CASE 0.” Users
either visit the website using the traditional PULL method or choose
to stay out of the market. Fig. 1 demonstrates the market outcome.
Users in the segment [x0,a] will visit the website, users in the segment
[0,x0] will not visit the website, and the marginal visitor, located at x0,
gains a value of x0 from Web browsing. The total trafﬁc load to the
website is ρ0=a−x0=N0.
Thismarginal user x0 is given by x0+b−p−S−CA−w(a−x0)=0.
Solving it gives the value of
x0 ¼−bþ CA þ pþ Sþ aw
1þw : ð3Þ
The website's proﬁt is
π0 ¼ ρ0 Aþ p−cð Þ ¼ aþ b−CA−p−Sð Þ Aþ p−cð Þ
1þw : ð4Þ
I deﬁne two variables, M and K.
M ¼ b−CA−p−S−aw ð5Þ
K ¼ CA þ S ð6Þ
The variableM is a direct visitor'sminimal surplus leftover. It is the
utility obtained by the direct visitor who gains zero value from Web
6 Direct visitors and RSS visitors are assumed to have the same probability of con-
suming online content and generate the same content-sales revenue in expectation.
Table 1
List of parameters and variables.
S The search costs (of a direct visitor)
CA The anti-advertising costs (of a direct visitor)
w The unit trafﬁc costs for a visitor
ρ The effective trafﬁc load of the website
b A visitor's value of consuming his interested online content
x A visitor's value of the Web browsing, x~U[0,a]
p The expected content-sales revenue per visitor
A The advertising revenue per (direct) visitor
c The unit maintenance costs of the website
θ The effective trafﬁc load imposed by one RSS visitor, θ≤1
xi The indifferent visitor in case i
Nj
i The total number of visitors to the website j in case i
ND,j
i (NR,ji ) The number of direct (RSS) visitors to the website j in case i
ρji The effective trafﬁc load of the website j in case i
K A user's cost savings from using the RSS technology, K=CA+S
M The minimal utility from direct visit, M=b−CA−p−S−awb0
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browsing and when the website is mostly crowded (i.e., the fully cov-
ered market with ρ=a).7 The variable K measures a user's total cost
savings from using the RSS approach (compared to using the direct
visit method).
Eqs. (3) and (4) can be written as
x0 ¼ Mj j
1þw and π
0 ¼ aþM þ awð Þ Aþ p−cð Þ
1þw : ð7Þ
Now consider CASE 1, in which the monopoly website adopts the
RSS technology. The website uses both PULL and PUSH methods to
deliver its online content to potential users. Users can access their de-
sired content using an RSS program or visit the website directly. Their
choices depend on the tradeoffs between cost savings (from avoiding
searching and downloading advertisements) and utility losses (from
skipping the Web browsing). The ﬁnal market segmentation is
shown in Fig. 2. There is a user at xDR who gains a value of xDR from
the Web browsing and is indifferent between the two visiting ap-
proaches. Therefore, all users in [xDR,a] are direct visitors and ND1=
(a−xDR). Among users in [0,xDR], some will visit the website using
an RSS program, while others will not visit at all.8 Denote the number
of RSS visitors by NR1. The values of xDR and NR1 are determined by the
following equations.
b−p−wρ1 ¼ xDR þ b−p−S−CA−wρ1 ð8Þ
b−p−wρ1 ¼ 0 ð9Þ
ρ1 ¼ a−xDR
 
þ θN1R ≤ N1 ¼ a−xDR
 
þ N1R ð10Þ
The left-hand side of Eq. (8) is the utility for the user xDR when he
visits through RSS feeds, and the right-hand side is his utility from the
direct website visit. So Eq. (8) states that the user xDR gains the same
utility from both visiting channels and thus is called the “indifferent
user.” Eq. (9) states that in equilibrium, an RSS user gains zero total
utility; hence, he is indifferent between visiting through RSS and
staying out of the market. The reason is as follows. If there is any pos-
itive utility, some users in the segment [0,xDR], who currently choose
to stay out of the market, will use RSS to visit the website. This results
in a higher trafﬁc load on the website and reduces the utility for each
web visitor. The number of RSS visitors will keep increasing until
there is no more positive utility to gain. It then reaches the ﬁnal
market equilibrium. In equilibrium, RSS users gain zero utility and
the market size will not increase further. Eq. (10) gives the effective
trafﬁc load of the website ρ, which is always no larger than the total
market size of the website N1.
Solving these equations and simplifying, I get
xDR ¼ CA þ S ¼ K ð11Þ
N1R ¼
K
θ
þM þ K
wθ
≥ 0: ð12Þ
Eq. (11) states that users' cost savings from RSS, K, deﬁnes the in-
different user. When users choose between the two visiting methods,
they follow a simple rule. Users whose value from Web browsing is
less than the cost savings from RSS will use the RSS-PUSH method,
while those whose value from Web browsing is more than the cost
savings will stick to the traditional PULL method.
The website's proﬁt is
π1 ¼ a−xDR
 
Aþ a−xDR
 
þ N1R
h i
p− a−xDR
 
þ θN1R
h i
c: ð13Þ
Next, I compare the two cases, CASE 1 and CASE 0, to examine the
impacts of RSS adoption.
Lemma 1. When K≤ Mj j1þw, CASE 1 with the RSS-PUSH technology degen-
erates to CASE 0 without the RSS-PUSH technology.
Intuitively, when the total cost savings (K) of RSS decrease, fewer
users will visit the website through the RSS channel. When K de-
creases below the critical value Mj j1þw, there are no RSS visitors at all
(NR1=0 from Eq. (12)). In such a case, although the website supports
the RSS-PUSH model, no user will use it. As a result, the number of
visitors, the effective trafﬁc load, and the proﬁt of the website are
the same as in the benchmark case. CASE 1 degenerates to the bench-
mark CASE 0, and the adoption of the RSS-PUSH technology has no
impact on the market outcome.
It is more interesting to study the non-degeneration situation. The
following inequality gives out the non-degeneration condition.
K >
Mj j
1þw : ð14Þ
Only when the cost savings from RSS are large enough, relative to
users' minimal surplus leftover |M| as deﬁned by Eq. (5), will the
adoption of RSS-PUSH technology have an impact on users' Web vis-
iting behavior as well as on the trafﬁc and proﬁt of the website.
Denote the trafﬁc load change Δρ ¼ ρ1−ρ0, which is the effective
trafﬁc load in CASE 1 minus that in the benchmark CASE 0. Similarly,
the change in the number of direct visitors and the change in the
number of total visitors of the website are ΔND ¼ N1D−N0D and ΔN ¼
N1−N0 respectively. My ﬁndings are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. When the non-degeneration condition (14) is satisﬁed,
namely, K >
Mj j
1þw,
1.1) adoption of RSS-PUSH technology increases the total number of vis-
itors, decreases the number of direct visitors, and increases the ef-
fective trafﬁc load of the website. That is, ΔN > 0;ΔNDb0;Δρ > 0.
In addition, if K≥ Mj j
1þw 1−θð Þ, the market is fully covered.
1.2) adoption of RSS-PUSH technology may increase or decrease the
website's proﬁt. There is a threshold value P* such that when
p>P* the proﬁt of the website increases, and when pbP* the proﬁt
of the website decreases, where the parameter p denotes the
expected content-sales revenue from a visitor. The threshold value
7 Under Assumption 1, M is always negative. Otherwise, the left inequality of
Assumption 1 is violated. To be more speciﬁc, the absolute value of M measures the
magnitude of minimal surplus leftover.
8 It is important to point out that some users will still stay out of the market in Fig. 2.
Direct visitors
a0
x
0
Don’t visit the website
Visitors’ value from
Web browsing  
Fig. 1. A monopoly website without the RSS-PUSH technology.
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P* is the smaller root of the following quadratic function (15) and
P*>0 always.
−M
1þw−K 1−
1
θ
 
þM þ K
wθ
 
 p ¼ −M
1þwþ
M þ K
w
 
 c− −M
1þwþ K
 
 A:
ð15Þ
Proof.
1.1)
ΔN ¼ N1−N0 ¼ −M
1þw− K 1−
1
θ
 
þ−M−K
wθ
 
> 0⇔K
>
Mj j
1þw :
ΔND ¼ a−xDR
 
− a−x0
 
¼ −M
1þw−K b 0⇔K >
Mj j
1þw ;
Δρ ¼ a−xDR
 
þ θNRSSR
h i
− a−x0
 
¼ M þ K
w
þ −M
1þw > 0⇔K
>
Mj j
1þw :
1.2) When K >
Mj j
1þw, I compare the website's proﬁt after and before
RSS is adopted.
Δπ ¼ π1−π0 ¼ ΔND  Aþ ΔN  p−Δρ  c:
If there is no proﬁt change, it must be
Δπ ¼ 0⇔p ¼ Δρ  c−ΔND  A
ΔN
: ð16Þ
Plugging in the expressions for ΔN, ΔND and Δρ, I get Eq. (15),
which is a quadratic function of p. The coefﬁcient in front of p2 is
(wθ−1−w) which is negative.9 First, I prove that when p=0, the
website's proﬁt always decreases, namely, Δπ p ¼ 0ð Þb0. When the
website only earns advertising revenue, providing RSS feeds results
in fewer direct visitors, and therefore reduces advertising revenue.
In addition, the higher trafﬁc load brought on by RSS feeds requires
higher site-maintenance costs. As a result, the website that provides
free speciﬁc content (p=0) is worse off after adding RSS feeds.
Next, I show that P ¼ argmaxp Δπ pð Þf g > 0. In other words, I
solve maxp Δπ and obtain P ¼ b−w a−S−CAð Þ2 þ
θcþwθA
2 1þw−wθð Þ. To
see P > 0, note that Eq. (9) indicates b−wρ1≥0. Plugging in
Eq. (10), it states b−w(a−xDR)−θN1≥0, where xDR=S+CA. Then
it is equivalent to say that b−w(a−S−CA)≥0. As a result, P > 0
follows.
Combining the above three ﬁndings—that (1) the coefﬁcient in
front of p2 is negative, (2) Δπ p ¼ 0ð Þb0, and (3) P ¼ argmaxp
Δπ pð Þf g > 0—I conclude that the two roots of Eq. (16) must both be
positive and the threshold value P*>0. To see that the smaller root
is the threshold value P*, note that when p increases, |M| increases.
Hence, the condition (14) becomes less likely to hold. Degeneration
takes place before the larger root of p is reached.10 □
The ﬁndings from Proposition 1 are shown graphically in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3.1 demonstrates the impacts on the website's trafﬁc load and
Fig. 3.2 shows the impacts on the website's proﬁt. In both ﬁgures,
the OB line deﬁnes the non-degeneration condition. In the area
below the OB line, degeneration happens. In this area, RSS adoption
has no impact on the market at all. In the area above the OB line,
when RSS-PUSH technology is able to provide large enough cost sav-
ings (K > Mj j
1þw), RSS attracts users who otherwise would either pay a
traditional direct visit to the website or opt for staying out of the mar-
ket. As a result, the total number of visitors increases, the number of
direct visitors decreases, and the effective trafﬁc load to the website
increases. This result is consistent with practical observations. It has
been reported that providing RSS feeds does attract more visitors to
a website. According to a New York Times press release, RSS feeds gen-
erated 5.9 million page views for their site in just one month,
representing a 342% increase over the previous year [31]. News
Yahoo! also reported that adding RSS feeds into My Yahoo! attracted
26 million additional visitors in a single month.
However, RSS adoption is not always proﬁt-improving for the
website. Fig. 3.2 depicts three different regimes for the proﬁt change
after the adoption. When degeneration happens (i.e., below the OB
line), the website's proﬁt remains unchanged (regime c). When de-
generation does not happen (i.e., above the OB line), the website's
proﬁt could increase (regime b) or decrease (regime a), depending
on the expected content-sales revenue from a visitor p. The intuition
is as follows. The RSS-PUSH approach attracts some users away from
the direct visiting channel, creating a “cannibalization” between these
two visiting methods. It therefore reduces the number of direct visi-
tors to and advertising revenue for the website. In addition, the effec-
tive trafﬁc load of the website always increases (Fig. 3.1), which leads
to higher maintenance costs for the website. On the other hand, the
higher trafﬁc load will also bring higher content-sales revenue. There-
fore, the ﬁnal proﬁt change will depend on whether the increased
content-sales revenue can offset the reduction in the adverting reve-
nue as well as the increase in the maintenance costs. Proposition 1
states the existence of a critical value P* that divides the area above
the OB line into two regimes. In regime b the proﬁt shows a positive
change after RSS adoption, while in regime a it shows a negative
change.
To conclude, RSS-PUSH technology does result in improved proﬁts
for the website if and only if (1) users' cost savings from RSS is large
enough, and (2) the expected content-sales revenue from visitors is
high enough. Condition (1) is the non-degeneration condition, and
condition (2) ensures that increases in the content-sales revenue
are enough to offset reductions in advertising revenue and increases
in maintenance costs.
9 Recall thatM is a function of p. So Eq. (15) is quadratic in p. Plugging in the expres-
sion of M, I get the coefﬁcient in front of p.
10 Degeneration happens at K ¼ Mj j
1þw, which is corresponding to the point of
pd=b−w(a−S−CA). Calculating the value of Δπ at the degeneration point, I can
show that Δπ pd
 	
> 0. This means that degeneration happens before the larger root
of p is reached.
Direct visitors Users’ value from
Web browsing  
aDR
x
0
1
RN  RSS visitors; ( 1RDR Nx − ) users stay out 
of the market (do not visit the website).
Fig. 2. A monopoly website with the RSS-PUSH technology.
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A direct corollary from Proposition 1 is given below.
Corollary 1. Websites that gain revenues only from advertisements
(i.e., p=0) should not adopt RSS-PUSH technology.
When p=0, the condition p>P* is not satisﬁed (since P*>0
always). Therefore, for websites offering free content, RSS-PUSH tech-
nology is not a proﬁt-improving tool.
Proposition 1 suggests that there is no absolute yes-or-no answer
to the RSS adoption question. Depending on the concrete proﬁt struc-
ture, website owners should consider RSS adoption carefully. Below I
provide some general discussions for different types of websites.
Weblogs usually provide visitors with free content and earn little
content-sales revenue. They are likely located in the regime (a).
After adding RSS feeds, weblogs will observe a large trafﬁc load
brought on by RSS feeds, which imposes heavy maintenance costs
but does not bring signiﬁcant revenue to the site. As a result, RSS
adoption on weblogs will make it difﬁcult for owners to monetize
their content and maintain their sites. Such a ﬁnding coincides and
justiﬁes the complaints from McLaws, Google's RSS advertising pilot,
about his blog site.11
For news portals such as CNN.com and NYTimes.com, it may or
may not be proﬁtable to adopt RSS technology, depending on the
type of content provided on the site. My results suggest that these
websites only provide RSS feeds on content that charges a high
enough pay-by-view fee (p>P*). In such cases, more visitors after
RSS adoption will bring more content-sales revenue, and therefore
makes the adoption a proﬁtable decision. On the other hand, for
free online content or content with a low view-by-pay fee p (pbP*),
RSS adoption is not recommended.
E-commerce websites are likely to lie in regime (b), where
RSS-PUSH technology can improve proﬁts. These sites gain revenues
mainly from selling commodities or providing services to visitors.
For them, the expected content-sales revenue from each visitor is
high, and more visitors mean greater proﬁts. The ﬁndings here sug-
gest that they could be the main beneﬁciaries of RSS-PUSH technolo-
gy. Many e-commerce websites have started to use RSS feeds to
update potential buyers on the latest product information. For exam-
ple, the website SHOP.COM offers one-stop shopping, which allows
users to buy their favorite brands and products from hundreds of
UK online stores. It summarizes and lists RSS feeds in all shopping
categories.12
3.2. The ﬁrst-mover advantage
Two competing websites, A and B, are in the market. They have
the same proﬁt structure, as shown in Eq. (1). Here, I investigate
whether the ﬁrst-mover advantage exists in the RSS adoption scenar-
io. The research question is: If a website adopts RSS technology earlier
than its competitor, will RSS beneﬁt this website?
I start with the benchmark case, CASE 0, where neither website of-
fers RSS feeds. In equilibrium, they must have the same total trafﬁc
load, ρA0=ρB0.13 Otherwise, users will switch from the website with
higher trafﬁc load to the website with lower trafﬁc load until equiva-
lence is reached.
As Fig. 4 shows, the marginal (direct) visitor is the user who gains
a value of x0 from Web browsing. This visitor gains zero net utility,
and x0 is given by
UD x
0
 
¼ x0 þ b−p−S−CA−wρ0i ¼ 0; i ¼ A or B: ð17Þ
Eq. (17) indicates that this marginal direct user x0 is indifferent
between visiting a website (either A or B) and not visiting any
website at all. Users who are in [x0,a ] will choose to visit a website,
A or B, with equal probability, while users who are in [0,x0] will
choose to stay out of the market.
The two websites share the market equally. The trafﬁc load for
each is ρA0=ρB0=(a−x0)/2. Plugging this into Eq. (17), I get
x0 ¼−bþ CA þ pþ Sþ aw=2
1þw=2 ð18Þ
ρ0i ¼ N0i ¼ a−x0
 
=2 ¼ aþ b−CA−p−S
2þw ; i ¼ A;B ð19Þ
π0i ¼ N0i Aþ p−cð Þ ¼
aþM þ awð Þ Aþ p−cð Þ
2þw ; i ¼ A;B: ð20Þ
Eqs. (18)–(20) describe the equilibrium outcome in the bench-
mark case.
Next, I analyze the marketplace, where one website moves ﬁrst to
adopt RSS technology and becomes the ﬁrst mover. This is denoted as
CASE 1. I investigate how the number of visitors, effective trafﬁc load,
and proﬁt of each website changes, ﬁnd out who is/are the beneﬁciary
of the RSS-PUSH technology, and examine whether a ﬁrst-mover
advantage exists for RSS adoption.
Without the loss of generality, I assume that website A adopts RSS
technology and becomes the ﬁrst mover. Users now have two deci-
sions to make, namely, which website to visit and which visiting
11 McLaws, Google's RSS advertising pilot, said that on his blog site “98 percent of the
trafﬁc originates from the RSS feeds.” He complained that the RSS feeds were
bandwidth-killers. He was not able to monetize the website or take care of server costs
[1].
12 http://uk.shop.com/rss-a.xhtml?a=a&ccsid=2197650833-10127.
13 In the rest of the paper, I use superscripts to indicate the case (CASE 0 or 1) and
subscripts to indicate the website (A or B).
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method (RSS or conventional) to use. Denote the user who is indiffer-
ent between the two visiting methods by xDR. As Fig. 5 shows, users in
[xDR>,a] whose value fromWeb browsing is larger than xDR are direct
visitors; they visit a website, A or B, in the traditional way. Let us as-
sume that website A gains r percentage of these direct users and
website B gains 1−r percentage of them. It is important to note
that direct visitors to both websites are mixed in this segment
[xDR,a]. There is no cutting-off interface between website A's direct
visitors and website B's direct visitors. Users in [0,xDR] whose value
from Web browsing is smaller than xDR will either visit website A
through the RSS program or choose to stay out of the market. There-
fore, in this segment [0,xDR], there are NR1 RSS visitors and (xDR−NR1)
out-of-market users. They are mixed together, and there is no
cutting-off interface between them.
For website B, all visitors are direct visitors. The effective trafﬁc
load of website B is equal to its total number of visitors, ρB1=NB1=
(1−r)(a−xDR).
Forwebsite A, there are two types of visitors: direct visitors, r(a−xDR),
each imposing oneunit of effective trafﬁc load, and RSS visitors,NR1, each
imposing θ≤1 unit of effective trafﬁc load. Therefore, the total effective
trafﬁc load of website A can be written as ρA1=r(a−xDR)+θNR1, which
is smaller than the total number of visitors to website A, ρA1bNA1=
r(a−xDR)+NR1.
The following equations characterize the equilibrium.
b−p−wρ1A ¼ xDR þ b−p−S−CA−wρ1B ð21Þ
ρ1A ¼ r a−xDR
 
þ θN1R ¼ 1−rð Þ a−xDR
 
¼ ρ1B ð22Þ
b−p−wρ1A ¼ 0 ð23Þ
N1R > 0: ð24Þ
Eq. (21) deﬁnes the indifferent user. Eq. (22) states that the two
websites in equilibrium will have the same effective trafﬁc load (but
a different number of visitors).
Solving them gives
xDR ¼ CA þ S ¼ K ð25Þ
r ¼ 1− b−p
w a−Kð Þ ð26Þ
N1R ¼ K
r
θ
−−bþ pþ arw
wθ
: ð27Þ
First, note that the indifferent user in this competition setting
(Eq. (25)) is exactly the same as the indifferent user in the monopoly
setting (Eq. (11)), and that both are equal to the cost savings from
RSS, K. Regardless of the market structure (monopoly or competitive),
users follow a simple rule to decide their visiting methods: Users
whose value from Web browsing is less than cost savings from RSS
will use the RSS-PUSH method, while those whose value from Web
browsing is more than the cost savings from RSS will stick to the
traditional PULL method.
Second, I ﬁnd that, similar to the monopoly setting, to attract a
positive number of users, cost savings from the RSS-PUSH method
must be large enough, exceeding a given threshold value. Otherwise,
CASE 1 degenerates to the benchmark case, CASE 0. In such a situa-
tion, even if website A offers RSS feeds, no users will use it. All visitors
will still take the conventional direct visiting method.
The non-degeneration condition is
K >
−bþ CA þ pþ Sþ arw
1þ rw : ð28Þ
When cost savings provided by RSS increase (i.e., K increases), the
number of RSS visitors (NR1) also increases (from Eq. (27)). Such an
increase comes from two sources. First, some direct visitors switch
from the direct method to the RSS method, i.e., xDR moves toward
the right. Second, some users who would otherwise stay out of the
market now decide to visit the website through using RSS feeds.
In contrast, when cost savings from RSS decrease, the opposite
happens. As K decreases, the number of RSS visitors keeps declining
until the non-degeneration condition (28) is violated; CASE 1 degen-
erates to the benchmark CASE 0. For the rest of the analysis, I focus on
the non-degeneration scenario only.
Lemma 2. In the competition between a website with RSS feeds
(website A) and without RSS feeds (website B), when the non-
degeneration condition (28) is satisﬁed,
1) NA1>ρA1=ρB1=NB1=ND,B1 >ND,A1 .
2) πA1>πB1 if p>P1 and πA1bπB1 if pbP1, where the threshold value P1 is
the smaller positive root of the equation p ¼ 1−2rð Þ a−Kð ÞA
2r−1ð Þ a−Kð Þ þ rK=θþ b−pð Þ.
Proof. The proof for part (1) is straightforward. The proof for part (2)
is as follows. Using Eq. (1), website i's proﬁt, i=A or B, could be
written as πi1=ND,i1 A+Ni1p−ρi1c, where ND,i1 is the number of direct
visitors, Ni1 is the total number of visitors, and ρi1 is the effective
trafﬁc load of website i. Denote the websites' proﬁt difference by
Δπ ¼ π1A−π1B ¼ N1D;A−N1D;B
 
Aþ N1A−N1B
 
p. Since ρA1=ρB1, the two
Direct visitors, half visiting 
website A and half visiting 
website B.
Users’ value from
Web browsing  a0
x
0
Do not visit any website 
(out of the market). 
Fig. 4. Website competition without the RSS-PUSH technology.
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Fig. 5. Website competition with RSS-PUSH technology.
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websites have the same maintenance costs, which can be canceled
out. It is easy to show that website A gains higher content-sales rev-
enue, while B gains higher advertising revenue. There must exist a
threshold value of p, denoted by P1, such that (i) it is the solution to
the equation Δπ ¼ 0; (ii) for all p>P1, Δπ > 0; and (iii) for all pbP1,
Δπb0. As a result, this threshold price P1 is the root of the equation
p ¼ A N
1
D;B−N1D;Að Þ
N1A−N
1
B
¼ 1−2rð Þ a−Kð ÞA1−2rð Þ a−Kð ÞþrK=θþ b−pð Þ. In addition, note that when p
increases, the non-degeneration condition (28) becomes less likely
to hold. Degeneration happens at pd=b−wr(a−S−CA). Calculate
Δπ at this degeneration point and we get Δπ pd
 	
> 0. This means
that degeneration happens before the larger root of p is reached.
Hence, the threshold price P1 must be the smaller root. □
In equilibrium, all visitors to website B are direct visitors; website
A has both direct and RSS visitors. It is easy to see rb 12,
14 which means
that website B serves the majority of direct visitors. As a result,
website A, the ﬁrst mover in RSS adoption, owns a larger market
share (namely, more visitors) in the competition.15 However, it may
or may not gain higher proﬁt compared to the non-adopter (B).
Lemma 2 shows that which website gains the higher proﬁt depends
on the unit content-sales revenue p. Website A, which adopts RSS
technology, will earn more proﬁts than website B if and only if the
value of p exceeds a given threshold value P1. It is interesting to see
that the adopter of a new technology may not perform as well as
the non-adopter in an economic sense.
Next, I examine who is the beneﬁciary of RSS adoption. When
website A is the ﬁrst adopter of the RSS PUSH model, will its proﬁts
increase? How will this change the competition outcome and affect
the competing website? Lemma 3 compares results from before and
after RSS adoption for websites A and B, respectively.
Lemma 3.
(1) ρi0bρA1=ρB1, i=A,B;
(2) Ni0bNB1bNA1, i=A,B;
(3) ND,A1 bND,i0 bND,B1 , i=A,B.
Proof.
(1) ρ1A ¼ ρ1B ¼ b−pw and ρA1−ρi0>0, i=A,B, when the non-
degeneration condition (28) holds.
(2) Under the non-degeneration condition (28), Ni0=ρi0bρB1=NB1.
In addition, NA1>NB1 is from Lemma 2, part 1.
(3) From xDR=K>x0 and rb 12, it is easy to get ND,A
1 bND,i
0 , i=A,B.
To see ND,i0 bND,B1 , i=A,B, note that ND,i0 =Ni0, ND,B1 =NB1, and
Ni
0bNB
1. □
Lemma 3 describes changes in the effective trafﬁc load, total mar-
ket size, and number of direct visitors for both websites respectively. I
ﬁnd that after website A's adoption, the effective trafﬁc load for both
websites increases. Although website B stays passive, more (direct)
users will visit it, and as a result its market size expands.
Based on Lemma 3, I am able to study the proﬁt changes for both
websites. Interestingly, I ﬁnd that the proﬁt of the adopter (website
A) and its competitor (website B) could increase or decrease under
different market conditions. This interesting ﬁnding is investigated
further and stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. RSS-PUSH technology increases website A's proﬁt if and
only if the expected unit content-sales revenue exceeds a threshold value
P2, i.e., p>P2. Otherwise, website A's proﬁt decreases. Meanwhile, RSS
adoption will increase or decrease website B's proﬁt depending on the
relative magnitude of market parameters p, A, and c.
Proof. Website A is the RSS adopter. I compare its proﬁt before and
after the RSS adoption. Let Δπ ¼ π1A−π0A, ΔNA ¼ N1A−N0A, ΔND;A ¼
N1D;A−N0D;A and ΔρA ¼ ρ1A−ρ0A be the changes in proﬁt, market size,
number of direct visitors, and effective trafﬁc load of website A, re-
spectively. According to Eq. (1), proﬁt change can be written as
Δπ ¼ ΔNA  pþ ΔND;A  A−ΔρA  c. Lemma 3 shows that ΔNA >
0;ΔND;Ab0, and ΔρA > 0. Set Δπ ¼ 0. I get p ¼
−ΔND;A  Aþ ΔρA  c
ΔNA
>
0: Therefore, the quadratic function Δπ p ¼ 0ð Þb0 always has positive
solutions. Further, note that Δπ p ¼ 0ð Þb0 and Δπ pd 	 > 0 where pd
is the degeneration point at which the non-degeneration condi-
tion (28) is binding. There must be a positive solution P2∈(0,pd) s.t.
(i) Δπ P2ð Þ ¼ 0, (ii) ∀pbP2;Δπ pð Þb0 and (iii) ∀p > P2;Δπ pð Þ > 0.
Hence, website A's proﬁt will increase (decrease) after the RSS adop-
tion if and only if p>P2(pbP2).
To see the impact of website A's RSS adoption on its competitor,
website B, I write Δπ ¼ πb1;0>B −πb0;0>B ¼ ΔNB  pþ ΔND;B  A−Δρ  c.
Lemma 3 states that ΔNB > 0;ΔND;B > 0, and ΔρB > 0. Thus, Δπ
could be positive or negative, depending on the relative magnitude
of parameters p, A, and c. That means that website B's proﬁt could in-
crease or decrease, with no deﬁnite sign. □
The main conclusion here is very interesting. It shows that a
ﬁrst-mover advantage may not exist for RSS-PUSH technology.
There is a threshold value P2 such that only when a website's
expected unit content-sales revenue exceeds this value, RSS adoption
will be capable of bringing in higher proﬁt for the ﬁrst mover. More
interestingly, I show that RSS adoption may actually decrease the
adopter's proﬁt while increasing its competitor's proﬁt. In such a
case, the only beneﬁciary is the adopting website's competitor;
ﬁrst-mover advantage becomes ﬁrst-mover disadvantage, as stated
in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. When p=0, RSS adoption always decreases the adopting
website A's proﬁt but increases its competitor, website B's, proﬁt, i.e.,
πB1>πi0>πA1, i=A,B.
Proof. Since p=0bP2 , using Proposition 2, the inequality πi0>πA1
follows directly. In order to see πB1>πi0, I calculate π0>i −π1B ¼
A−cð Þ 12 a−x0
 	
− 1−rð Þ a−Kð Þ 	; i ¼ A;B. When p=0, it must be
A−c≥0. Otherwise, website B cannot survive in both cases. In addition,
1
2 a−x0
 	
− 1−rð Þ a−Kð Þ 	b0 must hold under the non-degeneration
condition (28). As a result, πi0−πB1b0 follows. □
4. Extension of the model: adding advertisements to RSS feeds
The analyses so far have assumed that the RSS program is able to
block online advertisements effectively. Hence, unlike direct visitors,
RSS visitors do not bear anti-advertising costs CA. Intuitively, such
an assumption will tend to (1) increase users' incentive to use RSS
feeds (note that CA is a part of K); and (2) decrease the website's in-
centive to offer RSS feeds. RSS technology seems like a potential
threat to the Internet advertising community. However, advertisers
believe that the use of RSS feeds should not mean the end of online
advertising; in addition, they are starting to explore the technology
potential of RSS advertising [13,19]. NYTimes.com, Google, Yahoo!,
Kanoodle, and RSS advertising networks like Pheedo have began
inserting targeted text advertisements in their syndication feeds.
Most RSS advertisements are just a few lines of text that differ in
color from the headlines and summaries delivered by RSS aggregators
[24]. RSS users are therefore exposed to a certain amount of simple
text advertising. In what follows, I examine how adding advertise-
ments to RSS feeds might affect my results.
14 This is implied by Eq. (22).
15 The same level of effective trafﬁc load can “hold” more RSS visitors than direct
visitors.
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When RSS users are exposed to a certain amount of advertise-
ments, they contribute to the advertising revenue by δ, 0≤δ≤1,
where δ=0 is the case that all advertisements are blocked by the
RSS program and δ=1 is the extreme case that RSS cannot block
advertisements at all. After having redone all the analyses, I ﬁnd my
results robust to this assumption change. The only revision is that
the expression of cost savings from RSS should be K=S+(1−δ)CA.
All other expressions and equations remain the same, as do lemmas
and propositions. Major ﬁndings and conclusions still hold.
Next, I derive the largest quantity of advertisements that could be
added to RSS feeds. Consider the non-degeneration conditions, in-
equalities (14) and (28) in the monopoly and competition scenario,
respectively. After adding advertisements, total savings from RSS de-
cline. The left part of the two conditions becomes smaller, while the
right part is unchanged. These inequalities are therefore more likely
to be violated, and degeneration is more likely to happen when
more advertisements are added to RSS feeds. Studying the binding
conditions for these inequalities, I obtain the upper bound of δ, denot-
ed by δ*. If too many advertisements are added to RSS feeds, exceed-
ing this upper bound δ*, no visitors will use the RSS channel, and
degeneration occurs.
Proposition 3. Advertisements can be added to RSS feeds, but there is
an upper limit on the quantity. The maximum amount of advertisements,
denoted by δ*, is given below. If this upper limit is exceeded, no users will
use RSS to visit the website.
δ ¼
b−pþw Sþ CA−að Þ
1þwð ÞCA
monopoly website
b−pþwr Sþ CA−að Þ
1þwrð ÞCA
competitive duopoly website:
8><
>:
Recall that an average direct visitor reads one unit of online adver-
tisements during his Web browsing and searching process. Proposi-
tion 3 states that a website should allow no more than b−pþw SþCA−að Þ1þwð ÞCA
units of advertisements to be inserted in its RSS feeds if it is the mo-
nopoly in the market, and no more than b−pþwr SþCA−að Þ1þwrð ÞCA units of adver-
tisements if it is competing with another website. This upper limit δ*
monotonically increases in b, the value of the online content. Hence,
all else equal, with more valuable online content, the website is able
to insert more advertisements in its RSS feeds and still not cause de-
generation. This upper limit δ* monotonically decreases in p, the price
of the online content. Hence, all else equal, for more expensive online
content, the website should be careful not to add too many RSS adver-
tisements, since it is easy to cause degeneration. In addition, this
upper limit also decreases in CA, users' anti-advertising costs. When
viewing and downloading online advertisements are more costly on
the users' side, RSS advertising has a tighter upper bound. As a result,
the website should strictly control the amount of RSS advertisements
to avoid degeneration.
5. Discussion
RSS software programs serve as both an information aggregator
and ﬁlter for Internet users and a new content-delivery mechanism
for websites. In this paper, I develop an analytical model to study
the economic impacts of RSS-PUSH technology. My model considers
two-sided decision-making problems. The website must decide
whether to provide RSS feeds so that its online content can be pushed
to potential users periodically and actively. If it does, users must de-
cide whether to employ RSS technology to visit a website or just use
the traditional PULL method to search and locate their desired con-
tent. Although the model in this paper describes only a simple scenar-
io for RSS application, it captures the most salient features of
RSS-PUSH technology. It is able, therefore, to provide valuable insight.
My major ﬁndings are summarized and discussed as follows.
First, I show that although RSS technology can always have posi-
tive impacts on a website's market size, it can also have a negative ef-
fect on its proﬁt. I identify situations in which the higher trafﬁc load
brought on by RSS is accompanied by a lower proﬁt. This happens
when revenue increments from the higher trafﬁc load are not enough
to offset the increase in maintenance costs and decrease in advertis-
ing revenue. More interestingly, if a website is competing with anoth-
er and is the ﬁrst to adopt RSS, the outcome may be that the
competitor sees proﬁt gains while the ﬁrst mover faces proﬁt reduc-
tions. I derive the conditions under which this will happen, and sug-
gest that in such cases, the beneﬁciary of the new technology
adoption is not the ﬁrst adopter, but rather its “inactive” competitor.
RSS adoption, therefore, results in ﬁrst-mover disadvantage instead of
advantage. This important ﬁnding offers an explanation for recent
complaints from some websites that after RSS adoption, they have
difﬁculty handling heavy trafﬁc and monetizing their sites. It also
serves as a cautionary note for websites that are considering RSS
adoption: The RSS-PUSH model is not a cost-free content-delivery
mechanism. A careful cost-and-beneﬁt analysis is needed when mak-
ing the adoption decision. Certain types of websites—for example,
websites that offer free online content or whose revenue is mainly
from advertising—should not offer RSS feeds. For them, RSS use,
though facilitating information delivery to users, cannot be justiﬁed
from an economic point of view. In addition, I also try to tackle the re-
cent debate regarding adding advertisements to RSS feeds. I ﬁnd that
potential visitors follow a simple rule when considering how to ac-
cess the online content. They will opt for the RSS technology only if
it offers cost savings larger than a given threshold value. Adding ad-
vertisements to RSS feeds, obviously, will reduce cost savings and,
hence, reduce users' incentive to use RSS feeds. Though it is possible
for websites to insert simple text advertisements into their RSS
feeds, there is an upper bound on the quantity that can be added. Be-
yond this limit, the RSS model fails to attract users. The maximum
quantity of advertisements is derived in the paper.
The model used here makes assumptions to simplify its analyses.
Admittedly, the reality is much more complicated. Here I provide
some discussion of model limitations and explore the potential im-
pacts on results if certain assumptions are changed.
First, in the current model, users are heterogeneous only in terms
of their Web browsing habits. Different users gain different values (x)
from Web browsing, but they all gain the same value (b) from con-
suming online content. One possible extension is to assume that the
value (b) is also heterogeneous among users.16 Note that the total
value for a user from visiting a website comes from both parts,
(x+b). In the current solution, indifferent users are characterized
by x only (refer to Figs. 1, 2, 4, and 5). In the new scenario, indifferent
users will be determined by both x and b, speciﬁcally, the sum of
these two values. As a consequence, existing Figs. 1, 2, 4, and 5 should
be revised. Two-dimensional graphs are needed to show the ﬁnal
market segmentation. Indifferent users are those located in a line-
space deﬁned by the value of (x+b).17 Other than that, however, all
logic, expressions, and math derivations remain the same. For exam-
ple, the critical value K from Eq. (6), representing cost savings from
RSS, remains unchanged. Equations that describe the equilibrium in
both markets (Eqs. (8)–(10) and (21)–(23)) remain unchanged. As
a result, major conclusions should still hold quantitatively.
Second, in the current model, the two competing websites are ho-
mogeneous. The purpose of making such an assumption is to focus
analysis on the impacts of RSS adoption. It is interesting, however,
to see how two differentiated websites will compete with each
other if RSS is used by one of them. Some interesting research
16 In such a case, users are differentiated in two dimensions.
17 It wouldn't be only one indifferent user along the x axis, but a “line” in the two-
dimensional user-space. All the users residing in that “indifferent line” are indifferent
users.
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questions could be addressed in the heterogeneous duopoly setting,
including “Is it true that only the cost-efﬁcient website that has
lower maintenance costs should adopt RSS?” or “Is it true that only
the website that gains more content-sales revenue should offer
RSS?” In addition, this paper exclusively examines the existence of
ﬁrst-mover advantage in RSS adoption. It would be interesting to in-
vestigate whether being a secondary RSS-adopter is a proﬁtable strat-
egy or not. It is also intriguing to study the adoption equilibrium
outcome in a simultaneous setting: Would we see “all websites
adopt RSS” as the market equilibrium? If this does happen, are all
players, including websites and users, better off with this new tech-
nology? The answers are beyond the scope of this article, but merit
future research.
Finally, based on my results, I assert that e-commerce websites are
likely to be the main beneﬁciaries of RSS-PUSH technology.18 This
theoretical predication, however, has no empirical data to support it
thus far, for two reasons. First, use of RSS in e-commerce websites is
in an early stage. There is not much mature evidence to show the im-
pact of its use yet. Second, websites are especially cautious about pub-
licizing revenue and proﬁt information. Hence, at present, this model
only could serve as a tool to predict the commercial value of RSS. As
time goes by, these results should be supported by more real industri-
al data.
Business applications for RSS technology are still in a formative
stage. RSS technology is a powerful tool that, when correctly used,
can redeﬁne electronic commerce, revolutionize online content, and
enhance Internet communication. Users are just beginning to explore
its potential value. As more websites provide RSS feeds and more In-
ternet users use the technology, more advanced RSS-featured busi-
ness models will be developed. The following are some potential
ways of using RSS on e-commerce websites. First, the primary use
of RSS is to give potential consumers real-time transmission of online
product and price information. This increases their purchase proba-
bility and, therefore, creates more business opportunities. Second,
the use of RSS offers tremendous potential for mass customization.
E-commerce sites could develop dynamic RSS feeds, for instance,
that send customized offers to target users. Such RSS applications
would beneﬁt both sides, by allowing online sellers to segment the
market and gain higher proﬁts, and online buyers to ﬁnd desired
products more easily.
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